FEINGOLD VS. KAGAN

Robert Kagan, who writes regularly on foreign af-
fairs for WPO is a prominent neo-con who suppor-
ted Geo. B. heartily and vocally before, during and
after the Iraq disaster. He was an avid advocate
for the Surge, and has kept crowing about its sup-
posed "success." That's even though nothing was
settled politically by said Surge, and its purpose
(national reconciliation) was not achieved. What did
happen that was positive (besides some violence re-
duction) would have happened anyhow, and in fact
did happen well before the Surge: we talked (and paid)
the Sunnis in Anbar into turning against al Qaida and
into joining us in fighting them. Granted, that's an
important achievement!

Of course we armed 90,000 Sunnis to do that, and they
remain armed and dangerous, awaiting our departure
so they can settle affairs with the Shia majority now
running the country. Not only are the Sunnis increa-
singly unhappy with their treatment by the Maliki
government, but the Kurds are likewise becoming res-
tive. And the Kurds have the best army of the bunch.

Joost Hiltermann wrote in the Christian Science Moni-
tor (3/30/09): " . . . there appears to be a disconcer-
ting focus on Iraq's upcoming parliamentary elections
as decisive proof of the country's successful recovery
and the main precondition for a withdrawal. In my dis-
cussions with administration officials earlier this month
for example, it was clear that many saw the elections
as a critical test of Iraq's ability to sustain itself beyond
a US departure. This singular focus on the parliamen-
tary elections is ill-conceived and dangerous."
(Ital. mine). . ."More important (Hiltermann continues),
the elections will probably prove very little. At most,
they will illustrate that as long as Washington insists on
them and provides a protective environment, they will
take place; there is no guarantee that an Iraq free of US
forces will resort to democratic exercises to decide who
rules. And while elections should be encouraged as an
indicator of political progress, they are not what will make
or break Iraq. As violence has abated, politics remains
highly dysfunctional. Fundamental conflicts over power
(how to divide it), territory (how to allocate disputed
areas, especially oil-rich Kirkuk) and resources (how to
manage them and share oil income) simmer without
prospect of early resolution and will determine what
happens to Iraq when the US leaves. Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki may have surprised friend and foe by
profiling himself as a national statesman seeking to
restore a national Iraq, rather than an ethnic or sec-
tarian identity, but in doing so he is alienating one of
his main governing allies, the Kurds. Thus as sectarian-
ism recedes, it is increasingly replaced by a struggle
between Kurdish and Arab nationalism, which could
turn violent." (Joost Hiltermann is the International
Crisis Group's deputy program director for the Middle
East and North Africa.)

Yes, Obama is getting out of the Iraq frying pan and into
the Afghanistan fire! Back to Robert Kagan, who is, of
course, just as hawkish there as he is and was on Iraq.
The neo-cons are always predictable, and usually wrong.
In the 3/30/09 WPO he has a cheer leading piece titled:
"Obama's Gutsy Decision on Afghanistan." It is gutsy
all right. I'll agree with him there. I did, in fact, in my
last blog. I explained that Obama's decision to "double
down" there is gutsy and probably doomed. Kagan
cheerfully assures us we can achieve our purposes there
by "rooting out government corruption, helping the elec-
ted government provide basic services, fighting the nar-
cotics trade and advancing security, opportunity, and
justice."

In other words, what we haven't been able to do in seven
years will now become doable, because now we are seri-
ous, as David Brooks wrote in a similar optimistic article
in the NYT. True, we are sending more troops, money,
and civilian development people. And this president is
determined. Kagan says "the president and his key ad-
visors, such as Richard Holbrooke, understand that better
and more efficient government in Afghanistan is the key
to the successful defence of American security." They are
pouring all these expensive resources into a mighty leaky
bucket!

What they don't seem to understand is the point of Sen.
Feingold's letter in the NYT (3/31/09). After granting
that we must be actively involved in both Afghanistan
and Pakistan, the Sen. writes: "But while the president
clearly understands that the greatest threat to our na-
tion resides in Pakistan, the strategy unveiled last week
has the potential to escalate rather than diminish the
threat." (May I insert here that this is also the strategy
that Kagan cheers.) Sen. Feingold continues: "While
the Obama administration's plan and rhetoric recognize
the vital need to confront this threat, the decision to
send 21,000 additional troops to Afghanistan before
fully confronting the terrorist safe havens and insta-
bility in Pakistan could very well prove counterproduc-
tive."

Here is the Senator's reasoning: "Increased military en-
gagement against the Taliban in Afghanistan could push
it further into Pakistan while aggravating the militant
extremism that has spread to more and more parts of
that country. New Taliban safe havens could emerge
from which attacks in Afghanistan or Pakistan, like last
week's bombing in the Khyber Pass, could be planned.
More Pakistanis could fall under the control of those who
would violate basic human rights, particularly the rights
of women and girls."

Further, Sen. F. writes, "Already weak government in-
stitutions could deteriorate further, undermining the
legitimacy of the Pakistani state. And a country with
nuclear weapons could be dangerously destabilized."
And, "President Obama has stated clearly that we cannot
prevail in Afghanistan without addressing Pakistan -- but
that recognition alone is not enough. We need to address
the insecurity in Pakistan before any decision to send
significantly more troops to Afghanistan." In other words,
as Fareed Zakariah wrote in Newsweek: " If we cannot
solve the Pakistan problem, we cannot win in Afghani-
stan." I keep repeating that, because our leaders have
still not got it! (For further discussion of this, see my
last two blogs.)

RAISING THE ANTE

The President is said to be "doubling down" in
Afghanistan. That's a gambling term, and we're
talking here about a BIG gamble! What makes it
such a risk are at least three unpredictable and
unreliable variables: 1) the continuing willingness
of the Afghan people to let us carry on our war vs.
Muslim extremists on their turf. 2) the continuing
willingness of the American public to pay and keep
on paying in lives and money for another eight years
or more. With the additional troops we are now up-
ping the ante from $2 bn. a year to $3.5 bn. 3) the
continuing willingness of Pakistan to let us attack,
within their borders, the bad guys we are seeking,
who take refuge there.

Now a few additional words about each of these vari-
ables: the Afghans are heroic fighters, who valiantly
defeated 160,000 Soviets. They did that with our help.
When it was finished, we left, allowing the brutal Taliban
to take over most of the country. Many Afghans (not
unreasonably) suspect we'll tire of this conflict, or its
focus may shift elsewhere, and we'll abandon them again.
So a lot of them are on the fence, not wanting to offend
the Taliban folks who might wind up ruling again.

As for the determination on the part of the American
public to see this thing through for 5 - 10 - 15 more yrs.:
Obama is "pot committed" as they say in poker. He's "in
for a dime, in for a dollar." But he'll probably be a one
term president if he doesn't achieve solid double turn-
arounds, in Afghanistan and in our economy. I don't
think he can do both with the dysfunctional Congress he
has to work with. Do you? If Afghanistan is still in
trouble four years from now, O.'s opponent(s) will run on
a plan for getting us out of there. So much for our undy-
ing resolve. The Afghanis understand this, even if we
don't.

The key to all of this is Pakistan of course. Afghanistan
is landlocked. All of our heavy military supplies that
can't get there by air go thru the Khyber Pass from Paki-
stan. Anti-U. S. Islamists in Pakistan are gaining in
strength steadily, and increasingly are attacking our con-
voys en route to the pass. If Pakistan gets sufficiently
upset with our drone attacks on their villages, they'll
simply let the Jihadis close the pass. Our choices then
will be: a. go to war in Pakistan. b. make nice with Iran
so we can go through there. and c. scale back our activi-
ties to what we can supply by air or through Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, or Turkmenistan, all of which are also land-
locked Muslim countries that dislike us.

Now you can see why David Brooks in his rosy scenario
on Afghanistan which I reviewed in yesterday's blog, did
not go into the Pakistan questions. But of course, Paki-
stan is the ball game. As Fareed Zakariah wrote recent-
ly in Newsweek: "If the problems with Pakistan cannot
be solved, the war in Afghanistan cannot be won." Period.
End of discussion. It's as simple as that (and as difficult.)

Regardless of what the Pakistan government promises
or attempts, it doesn't control its own army. And the P.
army's main concern is not Afghanistan: it's India. That
is because the Pakistani peoples' main concern is Kashmir.
We are on India's side on Kashmir. And it's the wrong side
morally. And the stupid side strategically. We claim to be
for justice and democracy. We aren't there, and we aren't
on Palestine either. Justice demands that the Muslim ma-
jority in Kashmir be allowed a free and honest vote super-
vised by the U. N. on whether the Muslim part of Kashmir
be allowed to become part of Pakistan.

When the Kashmir question is settled justly and fairly, the
ISI (Pak. intel) will stop training and equipping radical
Islamists that they now feel they need to fight for them
in and about Kashmir. It's in India's interest also that this
be settled without further bloodshed. They have already
fought four wars over it. The next one may involve nukes!
Then all bets (and betting) are off. The ensuing destruc-
tion is certain.

John Goodwin -- let me hear what you think.

jgoodwin004@centurytel.net

WINNABLE WAR?

David Brooks wrote an interesting op-ed (NYT,
3/27/09), "The Winnable War." He is in Afghani-
stan at the moment, and encouraged by the resolve
both of our military people, and the Afghanis he
talked to. He didn't talk to the Taliban, but I ex-
pect he'd find them equally resolved.

Mr. B starts out by admitting "we simply do not
know how to modernize nations." He then goes on
to explain in detail why we'll be able to do exactly
that! In the first place, writes Brooks, "the Afghan
people want what we want." That's undoubtedly
true in the broad sense: we all want peace and se-
curity and prosperity and a better world for our
children. How we get there is the puzzler.

Second, says B., "we're already well through the
screwing up phase of our operation." I doubt that: I
think escalating the violence with 21,000 more troops
is probably screwing up some more! The Taliban
will see our raise and reraise it. Besides, we are still
screwing up with Pakistan, which is even more critical
for us than Afghanistan. Suppose we are completely
successful in the latter; will that get rid of al Qaida in
the former? How? A. Q. is international. They have
bases all over the world, like we do. Brooks mentions
Pakistan without offering any solutions there.

Third, B. says we've finally got our priorities right. No,
how can we if we are still screwing up with Pakistan?
Fourth, the quality of Afghan leadership is improving,
opines Mr. B. I'll give him that one, since I don't know
otherwise. I suspect the enemy's leadership is also im-
proving. So what? That may change the tactical situa-
tion (like the Surge did in Iraq). It won't cure bad stra-
tagy. That has no cure.

Fifth, says B., "the U. S. is finally taking this war seriously.
Up until now, insurgents have had free reign in vast areas
of southern Afghanistan. The infusion of 17,000 (plus
4,000) more U. S. troops will change that." Yes, we'll turn
up the heat several notches. I reject the idea that we
were'nt serious before. But escalating the violence means
more civilian casualties and hence more angry, alienated
civilians. It means more destruction from our air attacks.
And more busting into people's homes in the middle of the
night looking for bad guys. A lot of "collateral damage"
goes with all this! If we turn the population against us, as
in Iraq, we're finished, as we are there, regardless.

Sixth, writes B., "Pakistan is finally on the agenda." That's
new? It has always been very much "on the agenda." We
have poured billions of bucks into Pakistan. And to
what end? Mushariff was overthrown because he was
seen by his people as a lap-dog for the U. S. Benizeer
Bhutto was killed (with the army's permission) because
she was seen as too friendly with the U. S. We pressured
Mushariff to use force against al Qaida in the western
frontier. He did, but his own intel (ISI) tipped them off
when and where the attacks were coming. I'll have more
to say about Pakistan in the next blog. That's it for now.

John Goodwin jgoodwin004@centurytel.net