COSTS OF THE FUTURE

As Noam Chomsky has eloquently shown, this country,
like most, often places profits ahead of people. But profits,
examined closely, turn out to be illusory, in fact nonexistent.
So wrote Peter Drucker, the management guru, in Post
Capitalist Society: "There is no such thing as 'profit.'
There are only costs: costs of the past (which the accoun-
tant records) and costs of an uncertain future. And the
minimum financial return from the operations of the past
that is adequate to the costs of the future is the cost of
capital."

What are some of the future costs that we face? We'll take
a longer look at future environmental costs, but first I'll
mention briefly some of the others: 1) neglected and crum-
bling infrastructure desperately needs at least $1.6 trill.
in repairs, for starters. That estimate is from the Amer.
Society of Civil Engineers.

2) Our federal debt is close to $12 trillion and growing at
one trillion plus per year. Total debt, private and public
of all kinds in the U.S. exceeds $57 trillion! Interest we pay
on all types of federal debt will run $383 billion this year.
It was $451 last year, and $430 billion the year before.
And so on. That's money down the toilet.

3) Our neglected and ailing education system is costly in
undeveloped potential. In a global labor market, many
European and Asian countries are ahead of us in training
young people for high tech careers. But those are and will
be the bulk of well-paying jobs. Young people without high
quality education are permanently handicapped, and tend
to fall through the cracks.

4) Military waste and redundancy in planes, ships and
other hardware continue to cost multi-billions. Also, we
have spent over a trillion dollars on Iraq, and will spend
another $165 billion there this year. We are due to be there
another year. Afghanistan is warming up. We've spent
$65 billion there so far this year, and it's growing.

5)Environmental destruction over the past years is truly
incalculable as is the cost. I'll skip the damage from logging,
over-fishing, chemical, factory-farming and other kinds of
pollution, and just focus on environmental damage from
mining: There we find acid mine drainage formation, wide-
pread erosion and sedimentation, cyanide and other chemi-
cal releases, fugitive dust emissions, habitat modification,
surface and ground water contamination, mountain top
removal in Appalachia, environmental problems created
by abandoned mines in the West, and on and on. Mining
creates 96% of arsenic omissions. Other toxins released
are mercury, cyanide, selenium and lead. On site tailing
dams often fail dumping stored toxins. There are 79 tons
of mine waste for every ounce of gold extracted.

1872 mining law allows companies to extract $ billions
worth of precious metals from public-owned lands, pay no
royalties, and frequently avoid liability for environmental
damage and lost federal revenue. Congress refuses to end
the giveaways, even when we are running $ trillion deficits,
and can't afford truly universal health care, quality educa-
tion or repair of our infrastructure. Instead, congress re-
wards them with substantial tax subsidies. I guess we get
the government we deserve!

jgoodwin004@centurytel.net

PLAYING "WHACK-A-MOLE" IN AFGHANISTAN (Cont'd)

In the last blog I talked about some of the history and
demographics of Afghanistan (Af.). I will turn now to
current U. S. policy there. In the latest Newsweek
(10/12/09), Jonathan Alter wrote about "Six lessons
of Vietnam." After reviewing the lessons, he went on
to say "Vietnam analogies can be treacherous." If that
is so, why is he using them? Of course, any analogies
can be misused, as he goes on to demonstrate: "Unlike
the Viet Cong, the much-despised Taliban aren't au-
thentic Afghan nationalists." That's true: they are
Pashtuns first and foremost. The same for the Tajiks,
the Uzbeks, and so on. What the Taliban are, that the
others aren't, is fanatical Islamists. They are as dedi-
cated to Islamic fundamentalism as the Viet Cong were
to nationalism! Where's the difference? A difference
that makes no difference is no difference (Wm. James).
He goes on to add: "And unlike Vietnam, where U. S.
national security was not at stake, safe haven for Al
Qaeda could lead to another attack." This too is com-
plete nonsense: al Qaeda won't attack us again unless
and until they have a "safe haven" in Afghanistan?
Aren't they (unlike the Taliban) international? Don't
they have strong groups in Yemen and Somalia, to name
a few? This is the false premise, pushed by Gen. Petra-
eus, and bought hook, line, and sinker, by Obama, that
Af. is somehow crucial to our security from Qaeda. Pet-
raeous likes to point out that "the origins of 9/11 were in
Kandahar." So as long as we keep them out of Kandahar,
we're good? They can't do plotting anywhere else? And
this passes for strategic thinking, endorsed by pundits?
(And parroted by the neo-cons?) God help us!

Henry Kissenger (HK) wrote a more informative and bet-
ter reasoned review of our situation in the same (10/12/09)
issue of Newsweek. He wants us to give Gen. McCrystal
the additional troops he is requesting. And he has no pro-
lem using analogies from Vietnam. He says "the prevailing
strategy . . . is based on the classic anti-insurrection doc-
trine: to build a central government, commit it to the im-
rovement of the lives of its people, and then protect the
population until the government's own forces are able."

But then HK has to admit we are pouring our water into an
extremely leaky bucket, with a long, long ways to go! Af.
is not now and never has been a nation, except in maps
drawn by the Brits in 1893. Never, ever. "Afghanistan has
been governed, if at all," says HK, "by a coalition of local
feudal or semi-feudal rulers." (They're called "war lords",
Henry.) "In the past," he continues, "any attempt to endow
the central government with overriding authority has been
resisted by established local rulers. Now here's the clincher
from HK that spells doom for the current strategy (which,
remember) he himself supports: "That (the resistance by
local rulers) is likely to be the fate of any central govern-
ment in Kabul, regardless of its ideological colorization,
and perhaps even its efficiency . . . Can a civil society be
built on a national basis in a country which is neither a
nation nor a state? (emphasis mine.)

Here HK ably explains the flaw in the strategy he supports!
He supports it, he says, because all other options are equally
bad. He doesn't mention the endemic corruption in the
country, or the opium money feeding it and the Taliban and
the war lords, or that the people being trained in the national
army, when push comes to shove, will remain loyal and obedi-
ent to family, tribe, ethnic group and war lord over a national
government they regard as weak and corrupt and dependent
on foreign powers that keep blowing up wedding parties from
drones overhead.

In short, as numerous experts have opined, the Taliban pro-
bably can't be defeated by any number of foreign troops.
They are natives. They know the language, the culture, the
terrain, the people, and they have a safe haven across the
border in Pakistan. As Fareed Zakaria has said, "Unless
the problem with Pakistan is solved, the war in Afghanistan
can't be won." Don't hold your breath!

Let me hear what you think!

Jgoodwin004@centurytel.net

PLAYING "WHACK-A-MOLE IN AFGHANISTAN

"I'm not against all wars. I'm against dumb wars."
--- Candidate Obama

"We are going to lose the war in Afghanistan, and it will
bankrupt us." --- Chalmers Johnson

This is a dumb war, unwinnable, and hence the question
of whether it is necessary or not, is moot. You can't carry
water very far in a leaky bucket. Afghan. is an extremely
leaky bucket, and the journey will be long indeed. I will
attempt here to show some of the reasons why.

The Durand Line between Afghan. and Pakistan was es-
tablished by the Brits in 1893 by the foreign secretary at
the time, Lord Durand. It has never been accepted by the
natives there, the Pashtuns, who are not governed by
anyone, and live on both sides of the Durand Line, but
most of the 41 million Pashtuns live in Pakistan. About
12 or 13 million of them live in Afghan. and control their
section in the south of that country. They are legendary
warriors, and have successfully resisted any and all tries
to conquer them, going back to Alexander the Great, and
including Genghis Khan, the British (3 times), the Soviets,
and Pakistan, who has learned to leave them alone. That's
a lesson we will learn in time, but the question is when?
Tuition for that lesson is costly, as the Brits and Soviets
finally learned.

Most of the Taliban (practically 100%) are Pashtuns who
were trained and armed by Pakistan (with U. S. $) to fight
the Soviets. It cost us about $3 bn., and now we are conv-
inced that we have to fight them! The tragedy is that the
Soviets were doing nation building, the job we are trying to
do now under heavy attack from the Taliban that we armed.
Yes, what is not well known here is that the Soviets were
building schools, roads, health facilities and infrastructure in
a fairly peaceful setting until our CIA (under the Carter
admin.) started paying warlords to fight the Ruskies. The
CIA was able to unite the tribes in the north into the North-
ern Alliance. Those tribes had been enemies, historically,
and bitter enemies of the Pashtun. (They still are.) They
will not be beaten by the Taliban as long as we help them
by paying their armies for them.

The Taliban, of course, can keep fighting us as long as they
have refuges in Pak. with their fellow Pashtuns. Elements
of the Pak. intelligence service (ISI) that trained the Taliban
initially still maintain close ties with them. That is one rea-
son why the T. can't be defeated by us: the ISI doesn't
want them defeated. The Northern Alliance maintains
close ties with India, and the Pakistani army is much more
worried about India than it is Afghan. The U. S., by way
of its new aid bill for Pak. (Kerry-Lugar) is trying to curtail
or "guide" Pakistan army relations with the Taliban. Of
course the P. army is not having a bit of that, as they see it
as an attack on P. sovereignty. Google Pak. newspapers if
you're interested in the debate. The Pak. gov't wants the
moola ($7.5 bn.) but their army (the real power in the
country) says no, no, no.

Now understand: the Pak. army is fighting against the
Taliban in Pakistan, and suppressing it there, while their
ISI is helping the Afghan. Taliban, which is a whole different
outfit. Our CIA, likewise, does things our army would
oppose if they knew about it, but they don't.

The (mostly secret) cooperation between Pak.'s ISI and
and the Afghan. Taliban is one reason that Taliban can't
be defeated by us or anyone else. Pak. doesn't want them
defeated. Another is the forbidding terrain which they
use so effectively. Another is the family and tribal ties
with fellow Pashtuns, who may not want Taliban rule,
but also do not want them wiped out. Pashtuns are the
largest ethnic group in Afghan. by far, and have always
been the dominant force in a perennial struggle with other
groups such as the Tagiks, the largest ( 7 million) part of
the Northern Alliance. The enmity for centuries between
Pashtuns and Tagiks rivals that of the Sunnis and Shia in
Iraq. The Tagiks speak Farsi, not Pashtoon. Karzai, a
Pashtun, was opposed in the recent election by a Tajik.

(TO BE CONTINUED)